Shiite Fundamentalist Coalition Announced
Al-Maliki Might Not win Second Term
Al-Zaman reports in Arabic that five major Shiite fundamentalist parties along with some other personalities and small parties have announced the National Iraqi Alliance, the successor to the United Iraqi Alliance that had grouped the same parties plus the Islamic Mission (Da'wa) Party of current prime minister Nuri al-Maliki.
This move could keep Nuri al-Maliki from winning another term-- and could therefore affect the relations of the Iraqi government with American military commanders.
The electoral alliance includes the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Badr Organization (the political arm of ISCI's paramilitary), the Sadr Movement, the Islamic Virtue Party (Fadila), and the National Reform Party (Islah) of former prime minister Ibrahim Jaafari (a splinter of the Da'wa). There are also a couple of small Sunni factions (but this is not new-- the original UIA ran some Sunnis and three Sunnis were seated in parliament under that rubric after the elections held in late January, 2005).
Al-Maliki's Da'wa Party declined to join the renewed coalition. It is rumored that al-Maliki wants the distribution of seats in parliament for Da'wa to be increased if it joins the NIA. Da'wa was awarded only 24 seats after the last election, in which the United Iraqi Alliance had won 132 out of the 275 in parliament. Its rival, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), received 30. The leaders of the NIA apparently are inflexible with regard to the matter of proportion among the parties.
An extended and excellent analysis of the new/old coalition has been posted by Reidar Vissar to his site, Historiae.
Depending on the precise language of the as yet stalled electoral law, when parliament passes it, this development could be a matter of political life and death.
Let's just imagine some scenarios for next January's parliamentary election:
In the provincial elections held last January in Dhi Qar, ISCI, the Sadrists and the Islamic Virtue Party got altogether about 40 percent of the vote. The Da'wa got only about 23%. Other provincial tallies are given here. In most provinces, with the exception of Baghdad and Basra, the old United Iraqi Alliance did just about twice as well as Da'wa.
If the NIA does as well in provincial elections as the old UIA did in provincial elections, it will again be the biggest party/coalition in the national legislature. By the constitution, it would therefore form the next government, and al-Maliki may at that point regret not having joined.
Otherwise, in parliamentary systems often the coalitions are formed after the election rather than before.
At that point Da'wa may join the NAI. But I think al-Maliki will get more steet credit for having waited, and he might think he will be able to extract a price for giving the NIA its parliamentary majority, i.e., the prime minister position.
As I read the constitution, if the National Iraqi Alliance is the single biggest party/coalition in parliament after the election, it will be offered the task of forming the government (it will need partners to bring it to 138 seats).
That is, al-Maliki is taking a real risk in not joining the NAI, because if it can strike a deal to get to 138 without Da'wa, its leadership may decide to dump al-Maliki. The tough stance he is taking could well cost him the prime ministership.
If the Shiites go into the elections split, moreover, they will end up giving enormous power to the Sunni and Kurdish factions that take one of the two party-coalitions to a majority in parliament. You could imagine the Kurds trying to extract a price for helping form the government-- maybe Kirkuk province?
Aljazeera English has video on al-Maliki's fight for political survival:
End/ (Not Continued)
posted by Juan Cole @ 8/25/2009 12:13:00 AM
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5 Comments:
Easier said than done.
Maliki's trump card is anti-Kurd sentiment. The antics of the KRG have turned the vast majority of Iraqis outside Kurdistan from clear sympathy in 2003 to outright hostility and indignation now.
The Kurdish warlords have build a ridiculous web of alliances. The Kurdish allianace is composed of Barzani + Talabani + 4 minor Kurdish parties. This alliance in turn has: a strategic alliance with ISCI; a separate alliance with the Sunni bloc + ISCI; yet another adding Maliki's Da'wa to the previous 4; and yet another separate alliance with VP Hashimi Islamic Party!
The solid tie with ISCI can bring the new NIA down if Maliki ups the rheotric against the KRG, which he is bound to do.
The Sadrists membership is bizarre and can only be explained by strong pressure from Sistani and Iran. However, ther are strongly anti-Federalism and KRG. I am predicting that their shotgun marriage is not going to last, and they may well join Maliki if not going it alone.
Interesting statements from the Sadrists in (Arabic):
http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=533166&issueno=11228
Asma' al-Mosaway, a Sadrists leader, says in paragraph 4: the alliance does NOT represent a political bloc whose function is to participate in the general or provinvial elections, but a political institution aiming to save Iraq.
But in the end paragraph she says: The [Sadrist] Current does not have conditions regarding the next PM if the NIA wins a parliamentary majority, and therefore forms the next government!
There has been a long running feud between Sadr and Hakim, with bloody armed confrontations. One can only guess that the imminent death of Hakim has something to to with both joining the same bloc.
Firstly, this is fantastic news for Iraqi democracy. The people now have a genuinely competitive election in the offing with a real choice. Iraq seems to be developing into a pluralist democractic society - althouhg it pains to say, just as the NeoCons hoped.
I'm not sure the result will be as clear cut as you make out. If Maliki pulls off a coalition with the Awakening, al-Hadba and Allawi's INL he would put up quite a fight for first place. I think he's playing hardball because he thinks he could win!
I understood the point about Maliki and the NIA was that the NIA is not offering Maliki a guarantee of the post of PM.
Well, as a former British PM once famously said, a week is a long time in politics. Five months is even longer.
In my thinking, two factors will dominate the final configuration of alliance, perhaps after the actual election. 1) any arrangement which prolongs the US occupation is a definite no-no. Cutting it short is a possibility.
It is interesting that the new alliance calls itself 'national' (watani), making an appeal to nationalism, whereas in the last election no such appeal seemed necessary.
2) anti-Kurdism. I have no means of judging the present power of anti-Kurdish feeling elsewhere in Iraq, as outlined by anon. at 4:04, but it is certainly gathering strength, and I would not want to doubt his expressions.
Both these factors would tend to play in favour of Maliki. The NIA alliance is certainly the biggest threat that Maliki has faced.
I am unhappy that there is a resurgence of mutual Sunni-Shi'a accusations. Again, it is difficult to judge really how important they are. I would think they are now codes for something else, as in: blame the Sunnis for the Baghdad bombings, as there are no consequences, whereas tell the truth could provoke political problems. However Western media prefer the old story, and take the accusations literally.
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