Mahdist Cult Almost Defeated Iraqi Army at Najaf
Wave of Bombings, Mortar attacks in Baghdad
Marc Santora of NYT reveals that the Iraqi army was very nearly overwhelmed and defeated by the Army of Heaven militia of the Mahdawiya millenarian movement near Najaf on the weekend. They had to call in not only US airstrikes but also US troops to save themselves from being surrounded and killed.
The Mahdawiya is a splinter group of the Sadr movement, which broke away in the late 1990s, and was led by Ahmad al-Hassaani al-Yamani of Diwaniya. He styled himself styled himself Ali b. Ali. b. Abi Talib, that is, he was claiming to be the return of an (otherwise unknown) son of Ali (d. 661), whom Shiites believe was the true successor to the Prophet Muhammad. The Mahdawiya leader is alleged to have been killed in Sunday's battle.
Al-Hayat's identification of this movement with another Sadrist splinter group, that of Mahmud al-Hasani al-Sarkhi, appears to have been incorrect.
The buzz in the Right blogosphere that the Mahdawiya is somehow linked to Iran is a profound falsehood. Sadrist splinter groups in Iraq generally are Iraqi nativist and deeply distrust Iran. These cultists wanted to kill Sistani (an Iranian).
The LA times reports:
' Every day someone claims he's the Mahdi," [Iraqi security official Ali Nomas] said.
Nomas said the leader of the hitherto unknown Heaven's Army had told followers that he was a missing son of the Imam Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad. Ali's remains are entombed in Najaf.
"They believe that the Mahdi has called them to fight in Najaf," Nomas said, adding that fighters had converged on the Najaf area from other predominantly Shiite cities in Iraq.
He lamented that Iraq's death and destruction had convinced some Shiites that the end of days was coming.
"There's nothing bizarre left in Iraq anymore," Nomas said in a telephone interview. "We've seen the most incredible things." '
McClatchy wire service gives some more details of the leader, including further pseudonyms.
Al-Sharq al-Awsat reports in Arabic that Ahmad al-Hassaani claimed to have descended directly from the heavens.
For more on the ideas of al-Hassaani, see Reider Vissar's comments at Helena Cobban's Just World News.
The claim of the Najaf authorities that the Mahdawiya has "al-Qaeda" ties is just propaganda and should not be taken seriously. They are embarrassed that there was Shiite on Shiite violence.
Dan Murphy of CSM has more on the background of Shiite millenarianism. I am quoted to the effect that the hatred of the Mahdawiya for the grand ayatollahs is akin to the sentiment among some Protestants that the pope is the anti-Christ.
Reuters reports numerous car bomb and mortar attacks in Baghdad on Monday. Also a sectarian attack in Kurdish territory:
' *TUZ KHURMATO - Five worshippers were killed when a rocket propelled grenade hit a Shi'ite mosque in the town of Tuz Khurmato, 70 km south of Kirkuk, police said.
BAGHDAD - Three mortars killed 11 people and wounded 28 more in Zaafaraniya, southeast of Baghdad, a police source said . . .
BAGHDAD - A bomb planted inside a minibus killed four people and wounded five others near al-Mustansiriya Square in northeastern Baghdad, police said. . .'
McClatchy says that police found 21 bodies in Baghdad on Monday. There was also heavy fighting in Baquba, Diyala province.
LAT also reports on the renewed tensions over the Shiite Askariya shrine in Samarra, the blowing up of which last Feb. threw Iraq into a whole new level of communal violence.
'OK, if you say so' Department:
The USG Open Source Center translates:
Iraqi Kurdish leader, Al-Sadr delegation discuss ties
Kurdistan Satellite TV
Monday, January 29, 2007 T14:46:23Z
Iraqi Kurdish leader, Al-Sadr delegation discuss ties
Text of report by Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) satellite TV on 29 January
(Iraqi) Kurdistan Region President Mas'ud Barzani received yesterday a delegation of the Al-Sadr Current, led by the head of the movement's bloc in parliament, Nassar al-Rubay'i, and comprising Al-Sadr leadership member and MP Falah Hasan Shanshal, leadership member and head of parliament's Legal Committee Baha al-A'raji and leadership member and MP Salih Hasan Al-Agili.
In a meeting, relations between the people of Kurdistan and the Al-Sadr Current were discussed and the need for further cooperation in moving Iraq's political process forwards was stressed. Moreover, views on the security situation in Baghdad were exchanged.
The visiting delegation shed light on the Al-Sadr Current's operations within the political process and in the federal government of Iraq.
The need for cooperation between the people of Kurdistan and the Al-Sadr Current, with a view to serving the interests of the people of Iraq, was stressed.
(Description of Source: Salah-al-Din Kurdistan Satellite TV in Sorani Kurdish -- Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) satellite TV)
City/Source: Salah-al-Din
Muqtada is also sending his people to talk to fundamentalist Sunni leaders.
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim is still promoting the idea of a Shiite regional confederacy, an idea the Sunni Arabs and the (Shiite) Sadrists vehemently oppose.
posted by Juan Cole @ 1/30/2007 12:29:00 AM
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4 Comments:
Is this the first time US airpower and ground troops were used by the Badr militia (in Najaf, called the Iraqi Army) to destroy its own enemies? Isn't this what some of us have been afraid would happen?
[by the way, Juan, you still haven't shown how the British royals are related to Muhammed, other than as so many molecules]
Juan,
I'm finding it difficult to wade through all of the details regarding the battle in Najaf. Add to that posts like this (from an Iraqi blogger I'm unfamiliar with) and the picture becomes even more muddy.
I'd like to see a summary of the dynamics that will help me make sense of this complex situation.
Thank you.
What strikes me is what this tells me about the Iraqi Army. The article reflects what I'm sure was the official spin that they got their rears kicked because they misjudged the situation. But, later on in the article, its says they responded in battalion strength. It also says there were between 120 and 400 of the "Soldiers of Heaven" killed (470 in a preceding paragraph). Nothing about anyone escaping, and it sounds like they were on a suicide mission. So 120 to 470 is about how many people they were fighting.
I refreshed myself on what a US Army battalion is. Since the US is organizing the Iraqi army, there's a chance there's are similar. A US Army battalion is listed below. It should be more than rifles. It should have a decent number of heavy machine guns, lots of grenade launchers, and its own mortars for artillery.
Now, the Soldiers of Heaven seemed to have been rather well armed. There's talk in the article about 40 cal machine guns and some aa guns in their camp. But, even some well armed insurgents still should at the very best equal the firepower of an army unit.
So, on paper at least, sending a battalion in after a few hundred well armed fanatics does not appear to be an obviously bad decision.
One obvious question is "how many men were really in that battalion?" There are repeated stories over the time of the occupation about Iraqi army units keeping people who've long since disappeared on their rosters. The payroll keeps including their pay, which the commanders pocket. So, how many men are really in an Iraqi army battalion? And how many really showed up when it was time to fight?
Was the command mistake the fact that someone at some higher level thought this was a full strength battalion based on reports, but it was really massively understrength?
Even if only a few hundred showed up, that's still even numbers with the insurgents. And if they've got anything like modern infantry weaponry with proper heavy weapons support, that battalion should have some heavy firepower. More than even well armed fanatics. So what is the really the weaponry of this battalion? Are they getting the weapons they need? Or did someone steal that money along the way and leave them relatively lightly armed?
The other scary thing is the relatively low number of Iraqi casulties. The NYT article says "at least 25". For hundreds of men (1000 if full strength) fighting a big firefight with infantry weapons, that's not a lot of casualties. One maxim of battles is that usually a unit takes more casualties while falling back than they did when they were standing their ground. Troops that fall back have to leave the cover they had and usually move across some sort of open ground. Thus, its a likely assumption that a lot of those 25+ dead were killed as the unit fell back. What this says is that the unit took a relatively low number of casualties before they broke and ran. This really sounds like they ran into a group who could shoot back at them, they took a handfull of casualties, how about 10 as a wild guess, then very quickly broke and ran. Even if all 25+ happened before they broke and ran, and these hyped up fanatics on a suicide mission immediately ceased fire and didn't kill any of the Iraqis once they showed the first movement to leave, then 25+ casualties in a unit of a few hundred people is not really a level where you expect a unit to break and run. Of course, this goes back to how many men were really there. Are we talking 25 out of 75? Or are we talking about 25 out of 600?
So, some more interesting questions might be what exactly happened in the initial contact between the two forces? How may casualties did the Iraqi unit take before it retreated? What sort of 'order' did the unit maintain when they "quickly overwhelmed" and they "began to retreat?" Was this an orderly retreat with some soldiers covering for others while they retreat? Or was this a panic rout? Or something in between?
On paper, it would seem an Iraqi army battalion should have been able to handle this. If not, there's some real questions about the real strength of an Iraqi army battalion and its ability to fight a battle without breaking and running. I hope some reporters keep digging a bit on this encounter, because it seems to tell us a lot about the state of the Iraqi army.
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The description of a US Army Lt Infantry Battalion from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/battalion.htm
Light Infantry Battalion. This is the most austere conventional combat battalion; its organization differs most from that of the light armor battalion. This battalion has only three rifle companies and a headquarters company. The light infantry battalion is an austere combat unit whose primary strengths are its abilities to operate under conditions of limited visibility and in close combat. The primary weapon of the light infantry battalion is the M16. There are 65 M203 grenade launchers, 18 M60 machine guns, and 18 Dragons in the battalion. The Dragons are being replaced with the Javelin which is in its Full Rate Production stage. There are four TOWs, four 81-mm mortars, and six 60-mm mortars. The battalion has 27 HMMWVs and 15 motorcycles. There are no 2-1/2 ton or larger trucks in the battalion. There were 42 AN/PRC-77 radios. These have all been replaced by SINCGARS radios, which are the primary means of communication within the battalion. There are no redundant radios.
Thanks from Turkey.
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