Iraqi Guerrillas Made Key Demands of CIA at Cairo Conference
Al-Hayat says that [Arabic URL] informed sources maintained to it that the intelligence services of the Arab states, of Iraq, of the guerrilla movement in Iraq, and of the US, conducted discussions on the sidelines of the National Reconciliation Conference for Iraq held recently in Cairo, on how to isolate Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his radical Salafi (fundamentalist Sunni) faction in Iraq.
Iraqi guerrilla groups such as "The Islamic Army," "The Bloc of Holy Warriors," and "The Revolution of 1920 Brigades" conveyed their conditions behind the scenes. (Despite the Islamist names of these groups, they are probably mostly neo-Baathist.) Among their demands are 1) working to end the foreign occupation, 2) compensation to the Iraqis for the damages arising from the American invasion; 3) the release of prisoners; and 4) building political and military institutions that are not subservient to American and regional influence.
These guerrilla groups said they would never turn al-Zarqawi over to the Americans even if Washington promised to leave Iraq completely. They might, however, turn him over to a legitimate Iraqi government if the Americans were no longer there.
The Iraqi guerrilla groups maintain that al-Zarqawi's group is fabulously wealthy, and that he uses his wealth to entice other guerrilla groups to share their intelligence with him. He then bankrolls their operations against US troops.
They said that many Iraqi guerrillas are deeply dismayed at the al-Zarqawi group's tactic of targetting civilians and Shiites, and that significant numbers have deserted him to join the Iraqi group, The Islamic Army. Al-Zarqawi's "Qaeda in Mesopotamia" is angry about the desertions and refers to such Iraqis as "apostates." Nevertheless, The Islamic Army provides security to those who have left Zarqawi. Zarqawi is also deterred from killing the "apostates" because it would set the Sunni Arab guerrilla groups to fighting one another and "open the gates of hell." In fact, there had in the past been a few instances of reprisal killings by Zarqawi's men of those who switched groups, and the resulting tensions were so severe that Zarqawi concluded an agreement not to pursue and punish those who left his group to join another one.
The sources say that Zarqawi's ability to provide suicide bombers derives from his missionaries among the Jihadi Salafi groups. It also derives from his vast wealth.
The sources say that the guerrilla movement has not yet taken a stance toward the Cairo Agreements, and is waiting to see if they are implemented.
Cole: It struck many observers as very strange that the government of Ibrahim Jaafari accepted the demand for a timetable for Coalition troop withdrawal, and also acquiesced in the principle that guerrilla attacks on US troops were legitimate as a form of resistance to foreign occupation. Three important developments may explain Jaafari's flexibility here. First, his list has an election on Dec. 15, and he needs to burnish nationalist credentials. Second, his list now included the followers of Muqtada al-Sadr, who wants a quick US withdrawal and whose Mahdi Army has clashed with GIs. Third, we now know that back channel negotiations with the guerrilla movement were taking place in Cairo, and these provisions may have been an attempt to reach out to them and bring them in from the cold. Such a move would be in the interest not only of Jaafari, but also of the United States, and the latter may therefore not have protested very much about what were after all pretty painful agreements. (It seems to me unprecedented for a government fighting a guerrilla movement actually to acknowledge the legitimacy of the guerrilla group's attacks on it and its allies!) Al-Hayat thought that the timetable leading to US withdrawal in 2007 was actually put forward by Ambassador Khalilzad.
The tensions, over policy toward civilians and Shiites, and over defections from Zarqawi's group to Iraqi neo-Baathist ones, revealed in the al-Hayat article ring true; there have been some indications of these problems in previous press reporting.
I'm afraid, however, that the neo-Baathists want to take over Iraq, and are ruthless about the means, and that they will continue to want to do this after the US leaves.
13 Comments:
Juan, the attitudes of the various actors described in this post seem quite realistic, and therefore seem to me to have the ring of verisimilitude, as you say. But I am having a hard time imagining someone from the CIA (or any other US intelligence agency) being authorized to participate in such discussions. Are we to imagine that these truly are representatives of the Cheney administration? Alternatively, are they the sort of CIA renegades that Cheney has always imagined himself combatting? Both forks seem implausible.
Maybe Tony Blair has prevailed upon the Americans with this, more pragmatic approach, to the insyrgents in Iraq. Recently, the Labour Government introduced a bill that would effectively give an amnesty to all Ulster paramilitaries for crimes committed before the Good Friday Agreement.
Tony Blair today conceded there was almost unanimous opposition in Northern Ireland to a bill allowing fugitive paramilitaries to escape jail, but said it was an essential part of the peace process.
Tomorrow the government will bring forward a bill permitting criminals who committed offences before the Good Friday agreement and who have not been caught to come out of hiding and be put "on licence".
Defending the legislation to senior MPs, the prime minister admitted that all parties in Ulster except Sinn Féin would "vigorously oppose" the bill, but said: "They all actually know this has to be done."
.....
The bill permits fugitives from justice to return to Northern Ireland and be given a criminal record for their offence, but to remain on licence rather than go to jail. Paramilitaries who were convicted and jailed before the April 1998 Good Friday agreement have already been allowed out of jail on the early release scheme.
.....
Mr Hain also denied the bill was in effect an "amnesty" for killers and bombers, pointing out that they will face a full judicial process, and, if convicted, have a criminal record. They would, he said, only be out of jail "on licence".
The licence means that they will go to jail if their paramilitary is deemed to break the ceasefire.
As a Brit, it is very easy for me to support this but for many in Ulster it will be a bitter but necessary pill! Although, the Unionists are complaining loudly, it should be remembered that their paramilitaries were responsible for many of the crimes, particularly sectarian murders.
I think a translation of the story would be a service to blogging.
In my opinion they try to divide organisations in insurgency. I think that result will be the same as in example of last information. I don't think so that Bush or Cheney will give permission on this. The situation in USA can change only when insurgents will do so heavy damages that new goverment will be forced to withdraw US army from Iraq. Profesor what is your opinion about negotation between Karzai and Mullah Omar in Asia Time Online I saw article about it
No one should be under any illusions about the Neo-Baathists (to what extent the former Saddam regime controls the non-Zarqawi resistance and to what extent its fractured nature gives some ownership to more grassroots elements is another question). But this essentially nationalist resistance, which apparently has some objection to attacks on civilians and the targeting of Shiites, seems a good deal less unpleasant than Zarqawi’s faction. Furthermore, the latter is only strengthened by the US occupation, which in turn pushes the country toward civil war. The other side of the civil war equation is the US-backed government dominated by the Shiite political class, whose militias choose torture chambers and death squads as their modus operandi; perhaps a manifestation of the so called “Salvador option” apparently favoured by Washington.
Its worth noting that civil war gives the US the perfect excuse to remain in place, and the possibility of a classic colonial divide-and-rule tactic being employed here should not be idly dismissed. But the uncontroversial point to focus on is that of the US being the problem, not the solution, as should be blindingly obvious to people across the political spectrum by now. Since negotiation with the non-sectarian Sunni/nationalist resistance stands the best chance of isolating the vile Zarqawi and drawing down the inter-Iraqi violence, and since an external mediator, backed by military force, will be needed to keep the various factions apart in the near-term, the case for the US being replaced by an international force is absolutely plain.
These reported negotiations in Cairo demonstrate that an opportunity to defeat Zarqawi and at least stop the civil war worsening (perhaps even leading to eventual peace) is staring Iraq and the world community in the face. Nationalist forces (Sunni and Shiite) would welcome an international stabilisation contingent under UN auspices, and the world needs a stable Iraq so military, diplomatic and financial assistance is highly likely to be forthcoming. But the obstacle to both Iraqis and the world community buying into any such process is the US insistence on ownership. The current reconciliation conference could be the beginning of the end of the Iraqi nightmare if US citizens pick up the baton and force their to government withdraw its forces, and if Iraq and the world community can work toward a new, genuine transitional settlement (as opposed to the current fig leaf for occupation). The alternative is spurning the Sunni nationalists’ demands and persisting with the hope that peace may come as a by-product of US neo-colonialism.
David Wearing
London, UK
Professor Cole:
Here is view from anothe war:
the insurgents lost on the battlefield, yet they won the war. Strategically, they shifted the focus from the battlefield to the political arena.
Col. Thomas X. Hammes USMC, The Sling and the Stone; Chap. 6
The Vietnamese Modification (page 69)
The situation described by you is typical of the post-Vietnam insurgencies. Having created a critical shift in American homefront by force of arms, the isurgents now seek to move the "battle" to the political arena.
First they want to gain the moral high ground by distancing (and possibly eliminating) Zarqawi and his religious zealots. Second they give the Americans a face saving exit (like Nixon's "Peace with Honor") and then they go for the final showdown with the Kurds and Shiites.
I'm not so sure what the Americans gain in the long run (and its a good bet that the White House is not thinking farther ahead than Nov 1st 2006 or 2008), except for the face saving exit mentioned above. They might try to stay in the neighborhood, wait for the dust to settle, and reinsert themselves in the Iraqi political process when appropriate.
Either way, the long run presents three options:
1. The virtual annexation of South/South Eastern Iraq into Iran, leaving the Sunnis to wollow in the dust and the Kurds independent in all but in name. This last could only occur if a One Iraq/Two Iraq policy was observed (as per the relantionship between Taiwan and mainland China).
2. A tripartite civil war that may/would include all of Iraqs neighbors.
3. A return to a neo-Bathist state supported by its Sunni neighbors and the U.S./Europe with nominal independence for the Kurds, but with the countries wealth firmly in the hands of U.S. based multinational corps.
I always view any discussion of American withdrawal in the context of "enduring" US military bases in Iraq. I can't see the US giving up those bases under any circumstances. Isn't that the unspoken factor in any discussion of the withdrawal, either in Congress or in talks with the insurgents, Shiites, etc.?
Bases in Iraq, perhaps in the feverish dreams of a Paul Wolfowitz turned Lawrence of Arabia. Under the current climate, where would these bases be?
The Sunnis won't tolerate them both o ideological grounds and that any permanent U.S. presence (or foreign military precence) would serve as an impediment to their return to power.
The Shiites might be tempted, but bases in thier territory would interfere with any claims of legitimatize as rulers of Iraq (plus the Sadr movement has declared strongly against the U.S. presence). Plus the Iranians wouldn't be very happy about it (U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan with Iran right in the middle).
The Kurds would accept them, but that puts the Americans in a pickle, since bases in the north would be tantamount to an acceptance of an independent Kurdistan. That will increase the rift between Turkey and the U.S.
For the time beign I don't think that their will be any permanent bases in Iraq, other than the super embassy and the inocuous electronic snooping and intelligent base.
Hi Dr. Cole,
I read your blog regularly, and find you to be the most reliable source of sensible information regarding the War in Iraq.
Sometimes though, I leave with my head just spinning. I wonder if sometime you could publish something like "Islam for Dummies" and explain the warring factions within Iraq, what the religious ideological differences are, and how these factions are also divided along tribal lines.
I'm trying to get "The Big Picture" in my head, but I keep missing it...
Thanks so much for your continued coverage of this conflict and for being such an invaluable source of information to thousands (or perhaps millions) of us on the net.
You know, I find you quoted all over the place. Have you considered publishing this all when it's finally over? (and dear God, please let it finally be over soon.)
If a civil war in Iraq is construed as a battle between the the Shiites and Kurds on one side and the Sunnis and their imported allies on the other side, then the war has been going on since the invasion in Apr 2003.
Since the troops landed the front has been the "Sunni Triangle". At first the Kurds and Shiites were bit players in this war, but none the less allied with the US.
Now that we have trained and armed a few hundred thousand Kurds and Shiites (not to mention their militias), they can take over the civil war and we can leave - unless we want to stay to protect the oil poor Sunnis.
Diane S asked about having an "Islam for Dummies". I'm certainly one of the dummies, but I think "Violence, Greed, Corruption, Hatred, and Revenge for Dummies" might be more useful for understanding Iraq.
Andy wrote:
"But I am having a hard time imagining someone from the CIA (or any other US intelligence agency) being authorized to participate in such discussions"
Talking to unpleasant, dangerous and morally appalling people is one of the primary reasons for having a CIA. Though in this instance, I think you would have DIA officers at least sitting at the table alongside the CIA.
Secondly, anything that can be done to tactically peel moderate Sunni nationalist insurgent factions away from the Takfiri crazies will strengthen the chances of the central government surviving and reduce the severity of an interethnic/sectarian civil war.
Juan - I'm having a hard time reconciling this talk of a "fabulously wealthy" Zarqawi group with your argument that he is essentially irrelevant or perhaps even non-existent. Is this just a smokescreem by Bathists or does Zarquawi really have a pipeline to some big bucks from where: Saudi Arabia?
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